1963 Hawaiʻi Army National Guard Reorganizes Under ROAD Concept

PROPOSED REORGANIZATION of the U.S. ARMY

By Col John Campbell

The President of the United States of America in a budget message to Congress on 25 May 1961 advised in part that he was directing the Secretary of Defense to reorganize the Army’s divisional structure to increase its non-nuclear firepower, tactical mobility and flexibility to meet direct or indirect threats. Little in the way of official information has since been received, however, the July issue of “Army” and the August copy of “The National Guardsman” each carried excellent articles. In addition to the above AGO-Haw has received a consolidated draft format of the new TOEs and an undated article from HQ U.S. Army Troop Information Support unit.

Bearing in mind that many subscribers have read the articles referred to above I shall limit this report to an outline of the new division and its possible effect on the HARNG.

To save a thousand words I shall start off with a chart of the Division Base which is common to all divisions. The picture tells us that we will have four types of divisions, i.e., Infantry, mechanized, armor and airborne and that the division gets its name from the type of battalions which arc attached. The new division will get its fighting components by the attachment of combat battalions in type and number as directed by the assigned mission. Hence, the division is no longer a fixed TOE unit. It will now he a command base similar to a Corps hut with three subordinate tactical command groups not unlike the old regimental headquarters. The infantry battle group is replaced by the battalion and so we drop the pentomic and return to the triangular concept.

The units of the base support command of the division will vary slightly with the type of battalions assigned. 1he brigades are capable of fighting with two to five battalions of various types hut must have administrative and tactical support units attached in proportion to the miss10n, The new mechanized battalion is about the same as the present armored infantry battalion.

How this reorganization will effect the Hawaii ARNG cannot be foreseen at this time. However, it is fairly safe to assume that the Air Defense and Special Troop units will not be changed.

Also our 284th Trans Co should be retained in its present TOE as the new Division Trans Co though similar is much too large. With this conclusion let us then take a more detailed look at the Infantry and Engineer units of the new Infantry Division and in doing so take a stab at a possible solution.

The Engineer Battalion of the new division will consist of a Hq & Hq Co, three Engineer companies and one bridge company. The full strength of this battalion is 964. The Hq Co is similar to ours hut does not have a bridige platoon and has 58 less personnel. The Engineer companies are much the same except for three platoons instead of two and more personnel in Company HQ. From an organization and strength comparison the 227th Engineer Battalion should have few problems in changing to the new TOEs provided a platoon from each new engineer company is deleted and the bridge Co. is organized less one armored vehicle launcher bridge section and one heavy raft platoon. Also as many new items of equipment are not presently available. A delay in the organization of the bridge Co. may be necessary.

The combat battalions which will be attached to the division base will be similarly organized, TOE units, administratively and tactically self-sufficient and essentially of one arm. The full strength of these battalions will vary between 800 for the tank battalions to 900 in the parachute infantry battalion. A possible reorganization of our two battle groups could easily result in the formation of three infantry battalions. However, we could form two Inf Bn and one Tank Bn or any of several combinations. The main point is that the 1st and 2nd BGs have the strength to form there Bns at 71 % of full TOE. A closer look at the new Infantry Battalion in comparison with the Battle Group at this point might he worthwhile. The rifle companies are about the same except for the addition of a ground surveillance section and another AT Sqd. There are only three rifle companies in the battalion. The Bn’s Hq Co is also similar but with a ground surveillance section, and one each reconnaissance, anti-tank and a 4.2 mtr platoon with a Davy Crockett section added and the engineer platoon withdrawn. It is noted that the new Bn does not have a wpns company, however, there is the possibility that a combat support company will he added in which case the combat support elements of Hq Co would be deleted.

The new Infantry Brigade is tactically the same as our 29th Infantry Brigade but lacking in many positions of rank. Also the division brigade is weak in security, aviation, and communications which it must get from division. The deletion of the security platoon and reduction in strength of the Aviation Platoon and Communications Detachments accounts for a major portion of the drop from 273 to 143 full TOE positions. For our situation, the separate brigade should be continued or augmentations to the new brigade allotted.

We must bear in mind that the international situation coupled with new concepts of war make these changes necessary to assure a more efficient defense of our country and the free world. In the event these impending reorganizations become applicable to Hawaii we look forward with confidence to a smooth and orderly transition.

– 1961 September The Hawaii Guardsman pp. 3 & 15

Your Introduction to the REORGANIZATION

By Lt. Col. Cal P. Keiser, USA

Reprinted with permission from the Military Review

ROAD, the U.S. Army’s newest idea on division organization, is a realistic approach to the facts of today’s and tomorrow’s military life—one that will better prepare us to fight under the most diverse circumstances. Like the fighter who would take on all comers, the Army must be ready to quickly alter its weapons and tactics to defeat any opponent in any arena.

As the Army prepares itself to meet the challenge, it is most important that its officer corps understand the basic philosophies that underlie the ROAD organization and its employment doctrine. It is also important that we look beyond the immediate task of reorganization, for ROAD will profoundly influence the future of the Army.

ROAD is rapidly moving from an idea to a reality. Since May 25, 1961, when President Kennedy announced the decision to reshape the Army’s divisions, much of the foundation for the reorganization has been laid. Tables of organization and equipment (TOEs) have been drafted. The United States Continental Army Command has set the service schools to work writing training literature for the new divisions, and the schools have begun to incorporate ROAD into their curricula.

In its 1960–61 academic year, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College was able to orient a number of its classes on the ROAD concept of organization. The 1961–62 classes will receive instruction on both the ROAD and the pentomic divisions, and by the fall of 1962 all Command and General Staff College instruction will be based on ROAD.

The division-level training literature on ROAD organization and doctrine will be published soon in two field manuals. Field Manual 61-100, The Division, will contain the fundamentals of organization and employment of all ROAD divisions. Field Manual 54-2, Division Logistics and the Support Command, also will be common to all divisions.

Other manuals covering the division’s subordinate units and many special subjects, such as airborne operations, are being written by the service schools. Much of this literature will be ready for publication in time to support the actual reorganization.

In early 1962, the first ROAD divisions are to be formed. Sometime in 1963, all active Army divisions and some of the Reserve component divisions should be fully organized under the new structure. TOEs and training literature will be available to support their new organizations, and their personnel should include a substantial number of service school graduates with a working knowledge of ROAD doctrine.

Tailor Unit to Meet Need

The basic philosophy of ROAD is to fit the unit to meet the need.

The ROAD formula does not provide a universal division capable of doing all things. Rather, it is a standard division structure upon which the capabilities for doing specific tasks can be built. To the common division base, combat battalions—airborne infantry, mechanized infantry, just plain infantry, and armor—can be added in whatever numbers and types the division needs to perform its anticipated missions. The division then assumes the character, capabilities, and limitations of its particular combination of combat battalions. In other words, it becomes exactly what its combat battalions make it.

When a division is to operate in a known environment—for example, jungles, mountains, deserts, plains—it will be given the battalions that best suit it for its operational setting and probable opposition. For some very practical reasons, such as the requirements in personnel and funds, type divisions—mechanized, airborne, armored, and infantry—will be established.

To simplify the “tailoring” process, the combat battalions themselves are similar in structure. Each is composed of a headquarters company and three identical companies of its particular arm. Infantry, airborne infantry, mechanized infantry, and tank battalions are generally the same except for variations in quantity and type of equipment.

Since early in World War II, United States armored division commanders have tailored their subordinate commands to perform specific tasks. Fighting forces were formed by attaching combat battalions to the three small combat command headquarters. ROAD adopts this scheme of tailoring within the division, replacing the title “combat command” with “brigade.” Without combat battalions, the brigade is nothing more than a small headquarters having essentially no combat capability. With combat battalions attached to it, the brigade, like the division, assumes the character of its battalions.

This versatility does not stop at the brigade. The concept of matching the command’s capabilities to the requirements of the job carries down to the battalion and company levels. The brigade commander may employ his attached combat battalions without attachments, or he may form battalion task forces with combinations of arms and services that he believes are best able to do the jobs he has assigned to them. Cross-attachment of companies between battalions is the method used to build these battalion task forces. Cross-attachment of platoons to form company task forces is a further extension of the concept.

ROAD gives us a doctrine of building the organization to meet the needs of the task—from Department of the Army level all the way down to the fighting company.

Functionalized Support

ROAD also represents a new look at some old ideas on administrative support and adapts some of these ideas to the division and lower levels. It breaks away from the tradition of support by separate technical service units, each directly responsible to the division commander, and in its place prescribes a division-level logistical commander and functionalized logistical support.

The division’s administrative support units are grouped into a support command. This is not new. Division trains and support commands have been used before. What is new is that all divisions will have a support command and all division support commands will be similar in structure.

Logistical units within the support command are grouped functionally. Repair parts supply, and essentially all field maintenance, regardless of whether it is performed on engines, radio, canvas, or rifles, are carried out by a maintenance battalion. Supply, from rations to barbed wire, except medical, is handled by a supply and transportation battalion. The support units are designed to be fragmented. Each part is capable of joining and supporting a combat unit when that combat unit cannot be supported from a central location.

Reorganization Effects

How will ROAD affect the Army of tomorrow? Some of its effects, such as changes in strengths of divisions, different blocks on the organization charts, and new numbers on the TOE, are apparent. That the new division will require more men and equipment is also obvious. However, there are some other implications that may prove to be ROAD’s most important effects, and these, too, should be obvious in the light of ROAD’s fundamental concepts of combined-arms employment and logistical functionalization.

For many years we have been a branch-oriented Army. Infantry has been the “Queen of Battles,” artillery the “King”; armor has called itself “a way of life.” Until they reached Command and General Staff College level, officers have attended branch-oriented schools, Quartermaster, Armor, Ordnance, and the like. We continue to have branch associations and branch journals, and each branch, justly proud of its heritage, seeks to further branch esprit.

In the new division, some units that were formerly identified by branch lose that identification. Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation Corps units no longer appear as such on the organization chart. Their members are absorbed in functional logistical units. Others, particularly infantry and armored units, now are more likely to be organized for combat into combined-arms task forces. This means that commanders, both logistical and combat arms, and at levels down to the company, must now direct their thinking toward combined-arms employment—and away from traditional branch orientation. This is essential if we are to derive the greatest benefit from the ROAD concept.

This is not a prophecy of doom for the branches of service, because we will continue to need the specialists they produce. But it is a forecast for a closer integration of the branches at the division unit level, and a definite need for leaders who are well grounded in combined-arms operations.

Granting that ROAD dictates a combined-arms attitude on the part of brigade, battalion, and company commanders, how should this attitude be developed? Obviously, training commanders in combined-arms employment must start at an appropriate level in our service schools. Admittedly, our schools at Knox, Sill, and Benning now teach combined-arms employment. However, they are primarily branch-oriented schools. Leavenworth, teaching at the division level and higher, is the lowest echelon in the school system which is formally recognized as a combined-arms institution.

New Teaching Requirements

It is readily apparent that, somehow, the school system must meet the requirement for teaching employment of the new combinations of arms and services at levels below the Command and General Staff College. There are a number of ways in which this could be done. While it is not the purpose of this article to develop the final answer to this and other problems, it would appear that either the branch school curricula may have to be altered to the point that these schools are no longer branch-oriented, or there may have to be combined-arms schools established below the Leavenworth level for combat arms and the technical service officers. The Army’s School System may take on quite a different appearance as a result of ROAD.

How far will functionalization of logistical support have to be extended as a result of ROAD? Will maintenance and supply by technical service continue to be feasible at corps, field army, theater, or even departmental level? Or will functionalization at division prove unworkable without similar functionalization of support at high levels? Perhaps only experience will provide the real answers to these questions. However, it is apparent that ROAD will have its impact on the logistical system above the division echelon.

The idea of a common base for all divisions, together with common training manuals at the division level, and the possibility of lower-level combined-arms training present some interesting thoughts on tomorrow’s officer. This fellow should be pretty much at home in any division, be it mechanized, armor, airborne, or infantry. He should be able to transfer easily from one type division to another without having to learn new organizations.

Tomorrow’s mechanized infantry battalion commander should be equally at home commanding a force heavy with tanks, or one predominantly infantry. He should be quite able to build his subordinate units in whatever fashion he feels will best accomplish the tasks he has assigned—and he should be able to match the missions and forces he intends to give his subordinate commanders with their personalities and experience.

ROAD is a sizable step toward integration of the arms and services into more effective combat teams. While it does not eliminate the need for branch specialists, it is a move away from branch orientation and a move toward a combined-arms attitude. In the long run, ROAD may have significant effects upon our service school system and our concepts of logistical and technical service organizations and operations. It should produce commanders who have capabilities of all arms and services and who are at home in any type division. These may prove to be ROAD’s most far-reaching results.

– 1962 June The Hawaii Guardsman pp. 3 & 10-12

ORGANIZATION

On 1 April 1963, the Hawaii Army National Guard became one of the first reserve units to reorganize into the Department of the Army’s new “ROAD” concept. This concept facilitates the military principles of COMAD AND CONTROL by providing an appropriate number of combat infantry, airborne infantry, mechanized infantry, and tank battalions to a common combat division base for operations in a known environment. Under this concept, the 1st and 2nd Battle Croups, 299th Infantry were reorganized into the 1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions, 299th Infantry. Btry A, 1st Msi Bn, and Btry 13, 2d MsI Bn, 298th Arty, armory status training batteries, were reorganized, converted, and redesignated as Company A, 1st Bn, 299th Inf. In addition, the 120th Military Police Company was reorganized into an Escort Guard type MP Co.

– 1963 Annual Report pp. 4

ROAD Reorganization News

The Secretary of the Army has announced plans for reorganizing under the ROAD concept (Reorganization Objectives, Army Division) all combat divisions in the Active Army, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve.

Active Army

The decision to reorganize the Active Army follows the successful completion of field testing of the 1st Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas, and the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado. These two divisions were organized under the ROAD concept in February 1962, for test purposes. The performance of these divisions has demonstrated convincingly the soundness of the new division structure.

Reorganization of the Active Army will be accomplished on a phased basis and will be completed by late 1964. The bulk of the reorganization will be completed this year.

Maximum combat effectiveness of divisions will be maintained during the reorganization with no diminution in readiness to perform contingency missions.

Reserve Components

In order to make the Army National Guard and Army Reserve capable of compatible employment with the Active Army, the ROAD reorganization will also be extended to those Reserve Component combat divisions scheduled for retention under the recently announced realignment plan.

The conversion of Army National Guard divisions to the new structure will be initiated as soon as agreement is reached between governors of the affected states and the National Guard Bureau on troop list and stationing plans.

Conversion of Army Reserve units will be initiated immediately. This conversion will be accomplished without dislocation of the realignment of Army Reserve units currently in progress since this realignment was planned with ultimate reorganization to ROAD in mind.

The ROAD reorganization of both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve should be completed prior to the start of the annual field training next summer.

ROAD Concept

Present Army divisions are of three types: Infantry, Armor, and Airborne. The change will provide four types of divisions—Infantry, Armor, Airborne, and Mechanized—all with markedly increased capabilities over the Pentomic organization.

Originally announced in June, ROAD is the Army’s answer to future land warfare. Emphasis is on increased flexibility, battlefield mobility and firepower.

The most important factor of the ROAD concept is the ability to tailor divisions to battlefield requirements. Each division has a common base including three brigade headquarters, division artillery, and other combat and support elements. Combat maneuver battalions—infantry, mechanized infantry, tank, and airborne—are added to the division base to fit any type of combat situation. To form an armored division, for example, emphasis would be on tank and mechanized battalions. For an airborne division, emphasis would be on parachute infantry battalions.

– 1963 March The Hawaii Guardsman pp. 18

NATIONAL GUARD REORGANIZATION NOTES

Background

From time to time the Department of the Army reviews the Reserve Component’s troop basis to insure that adequate units of the type needed to back up the Active Forces are maintained within the Reserve Components’ Forces. After one of these reviews, the DA presented the ROAD to all the States for their approval on or about 1 December 1962. The State of Hawaii received a proposed plan from the DA through the National Guard Bureau for the Governor’s approval. The plan contained a proposal to eliminate the 120th MP Company and two ADA Batteries, and to reorganize the First and Second Battle Groups into three Infantry Battalions.

Without the slightest delay, members of the State and HARNG command and staff embarked upon a plan to evaluate the situation to come up with a satisfactory and workable plan for the Hawaii Army National Guard.

The first effort was to save the 120th MP Company, and the ADA Batteries if possible. Many days of deliberation, with numerous hours of study and research, reached a climax when the Chief, National Guard Bureau, accepted the Governor’s plan to retain the 120th MP Company (Escort Guard), and to eliminate the two ADA [batteries] for an Infantry Company with home armory located in Pearl City, Oahu, and Wahiawa, Oahu. General Orders #11, published by the Office of the Adjutant General, State of Hawaii, dated 29 March 1963, officially authorized the reorganization of the entire Hawaii Army National Guard.

Effects of the Reorganization

Caught in the reshuffle were a number of officers and enlisted personnel who found themselves with more rank than was authorized in their new units. Regulations permitted them to be retained for not longer than one year on the Guard rolls. All of the Guardsmen employed in full-time jobs at the time of reorganization were given the assurance of keeping their jobs, but some had to be shifted to other locations in order to remain on the payroll.

The effects of the reorganization also caused HARNG leaders to burn midnight oil while coming up with a plan acceptable to both the State of Hawaii and National Guard Bureau by 1 April 1963, to permit time for their units to retrain their personnel before AFT 1963. With AFT scheduled for 15 June to 5 July 1963, commanders and operations and training officers scrambled to locate training materials before the 1 April date for reorganization. It was fortunate that the HARNG OCS, training on the ROAD concept since its inception, were able to support the reorganized units with the latest reference materials, lesson plans and assistance before 1 April.

Still to come, and perhaps part of this chore has been accomplished by now, is the exchange of equipment between units. Guns, vehicles, radios and many other items of equipment will be laterally transferred throughout the State. Scores of inventories and audits will be required as new commanders take over their respective units. ASTs have shuddered as they buckled down to attack the mass of administration generated by the change. Many have indicated that they might quit because of the heavy workload, but all have weathered the storm and are still with us.

What has the reorganization done to our units? It has given them a degree of flexibility and operational adaptability not previously possible in the ROCID concept and Triangular concept of World War II and Korea. It has reduced our combat units to smaller, highly flexible battalions capable of adjusting to any situation at any point in the world and deliverable by a variety of transportation means. Our training objective will emphasize the type of subjects that will prepare all units and personnel for combat in the Pacific and Far East Areas of Operation.

– 1963 June The Hawaii Guardsman pp. 11 & 13

REORGANIZATION

In 1960, the Department of the Army directed that the pentomic infantry division be reorganized into a new type of organization, commonly known as ROAD (Reorganization of the Army Division). The infantry units of the Hawaii Army National Guard, except the 29th Infantry Brigade, were reorganized on 1 April 1963 to the new ROAD concept. In compliance with this Department of the Army directive, the 29th Infantry Brigade, Separate, will be reorganized into the ROAD concept on or about 31 March 1964. The new organization will be called the 29th Separate Infantry Brigade.

Since the strength of the Hawaii National Guard is such that it cannot support a division, the new organization will be a separate-type brigade and not a divisional-type one. However, in the event that it becomes necessary for the 29th Separate Infantry Brigade to go into combat as part of a larger force, this can be done without any difficulty.

Although the assigned mission to command and control assigned and attached combat support and administrative support elements in both training and operations remains the same, upon reorganization the 29th Infantry Brigade will have greater capabilities. This is primarily due to the addition of staff sections and a completely different type of aviation augmentation. Some of the capabilities are:

1. Provide command, staff planning, control, supervision and aviation support for 2 to 5 maneuver battalions, and military police support for assigned and attached combat and combat support elements.
2. Provide unit medical service and furnish aidmen to supported units.
3. Conduct Brigade operations on a sustained 24-hour-a-day basis.
4. Supervise tactical training of assigned and attached units.

When augmented, the Brigade can carry on civil affairs functions.

The organization of the new Brigade is similar to the old Brigade. The old Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company was composed of a security platoon, an aviation platoon, and a rather large communications detachment. The new organization provides for a military police platoon, a communications platoon, and an aviation augmentation.

There are several new staff sections in the new organization, notably an Executive Officer’s Section, an Engineers Section, a Chemical Section and a Provost Marshal’s Section. These sections, in addition to the normal staff sections, afford the Commanding General a fuller staff from which he can draw necessary information in the formulation of plans and decisions.

Because of the addition of a Deputy Brigade Commander and additional assistant staff officers in the S1, S2, S3 and S4 sections, two command groups can be easily established if this becomes necessary, which adds greatly to the flexibility of the 29th Separate Infantry Brigade.

The new aviation augmentation is composed of the Airlift Section and the Tactical Support Section. When fully equipped, nine tactical transport helicopters will be assigned to the airlift section and nine observation helicopters will be assigned to the tactical support section. These sections provide aviation support for the Brigade Headquarters and other Brigade units. They can also be used for general support and reinforcement to units with organic aircraft.

When participating in limited airmobile combat operation, one reinforced infantry platoon can be airlifted in one airlift, using only the organic aircraft.

Upon completion of the reorganization of the 29th Infantry Brigade, all infantry units of the Hawaii Army National Guard will be under the ROAD concept.

Reorganization of the 120th MP Co.

As with many Army National Guard units, both nationally and locally, this unit has been reorganized several times in the past few years. Each reorganization requires dramatic changes in authorized strength, rank, and equipment. The last reorganization occurred on 15 Jan. ’64, to which the unit responded admirably, although changes were somewhat radical in strength and equipment.

From an “Escort Guard” type MP Company, this unit was reorganized into a separate Military Police Company, able to provide general MP services. Such services include enforcement of military law, traffic control, security, and deployment to provide military aid to civil authorities. Persons interested in the military law enforcement field should contact Capt. Harry Brown, Jr., CO, 120th MP Co., at Ft. Ruger (tele. 541-640). Active duty training can be available at Ft. Gordon, Georgia.

– 1964 March The Hawaii Guardsman pp. 8