

may 4 -

NATIONAL GUARD SYSTEM INDICTED BY WAR EXPERTS

Army College Calls Organized
Militia Worthless As Compared
With Federal Force

DIGEST OF ITS FINDINGS
HAS BEEN RECEIVED HERE

Statesmen From Washington
Down To Present Shown To
Have Admitted Shortcomings

A digest of the paper dealing with the national guard of the country prepared by the war college division of the general staff of the regular army, has been received in Honolulu and has aroused great interest and profound discussion not only among the officers of the National Guard of Hawaii, but at headquarters of the Hawaiian Department and among the commissioned officers of the military posts in Oahu. The paper dealing with the militia is captioned "The Militia As Organized Under the Constitution and Its Value To the Nation As a Military Asset."

Federal Control Is Recommended

That the organized militia of the United States, which includes the National Guard of Hawaii, should be replaced by "a proper federal force," and that the training and military knowledge of the officers and men should be utilized to the utmost in the preparation of such a federal force as is needed, is the opinion of the war college division of the general staff. The minimum time needed to train an efficient soldier, in the opinion of the college, is 1500 hours of intensive work. The average extent of the training now received by the militiamen probably never exceeds, it is pointed out, 180 hours during the course of a three years' enlistment in the guard system of the various States.

As an instance of what the national guard of the country would be capable of doing in the way of active service the war college cites the Canadian militia in the European war. The Canadians had received a training equal to that of the average American militiamen. When these troops arrived in England they had to undergo an extra six months' training before being permitted to go to the front, while about 10 per cent of the entire enlisted strength was returned to Canada as "unfit for military service."

Army's View of Militia

The document is in nineteen subdivisions and treats the subject historically and tactically. Portions of the document follow:

1. Under the Constitution there are two ways of raising troops. Directly under the power of Congress "to raise and support armies." (Art. I, Sec. 8, Par. 11.)

Indirectly, under (Art. I, Sec. 8, Par. 14.) the power "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions." But for the valuelessness of the militia, (and other short-term troops,) the provision in the Constitution which authorizes the federal government "to raise and support armies" would probably never have been adopted, because of the traditional fear of a standing army. The omission of the clause would have resulted in a dependence upon militia alone.

2. The first important militia act was that of 1792. This provided for compulsory enlistment and performance of military duty by every able-bodied male between 18 and 45, and required their enrollment as state militia; hence, for the United States to raise regulars or volunteers under this act would be an encroachment upon a body already subject to the state as militia.

As this act carried no appropriation, and as there was no penalty for failure to carry out its provisions, and as there was no way to coerce the governors of states, it resulted that the States gradually assumed the power of legislating for the militia—the war power was practically turned over to the governors.

3. Militia Laws of 1808 and 1820: in 1808 congress appropriated an annual sum for arms and equipment; in 1820 it passed an act requiring that field exercises and discipline in the militia should be observed in the regular army.

4. Failure of the System: The failure of the system in use during the Revolution and subsequently was largely due to short enlistments.

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(Concluded from Page 7.)

home, added to the other incidental expenses consequent upon their coming and conduct in camp, surpass all idea and destroy every kind of regularity and economy which you could establish among fixed and settled troops, and will in my opinion prove, if the scheme is adhered to, the ruin of our cause."

The above quotations are just as true today as they were nearly 140 years ago.

6. Volunteer Act of 1898 and Later Militia Acts: The Volunteer Act of 1898 was based on the Constitution. It provided for a force that could be used at home or abroad and for general military purposes, and did not attempt to use a force that the Constitution restricted to three specific purposes. Legislation since then has gone backward and makes the attempt to use what the experience of 140 years has shown to be not dependable force on account of constitutional limitations.

7. The Militia as an Asset in Carrying Out Plans for the National Defense: To be of real value it should be possible to answer the question, What percentage of the present personnel of the organized militia, or as it would be at the time the President issues his call, would be available?

Question Cannot Be Answered

This question cannot be answered even approximately. In the first place there is a dual responsibility, and there may be conflict. If certain governors were not in sympathy with the war and if their constituents fear their own section will be attacked; if great political pressure is exerted to prevent militia of certain states being sent to the place designated by the President; if certain governors should disband the organized militia in their States (West Virginia, South Carolina, Nevada, and Kansas governors have done this), then the President's action would be in part nullified, and from this cause alone the resultant force might easily be considerably less than the existing organized militia.

8. Failure or Refusal of Troops to Service: The response to the call for volunteers under the act of April 23, 1898, once illustrated the worthlessness of the existing militia as an auxiliary to the regular army. * * * Of the militia borne on the company rolls many refuse to volunteer upon reason-

able grounds, twenty-five per cent were rejected prior to muster, and twenty-five per cent were rejected on physical examination after muster. The organized militia is better trained, officered, equipped, and disciplined than in 1898, but men are about the same now as always.

9. Lack of Physical Fitness.—Because the standard for medical examination prescribed for the regular army has been adopted by the states it does not follow that they conform. Those who have inspected the organized militia know this, and men not qualified physically would shortly have to be discharged and might later become unworthy pension claimants.

10. The time for Concentrating.—Due to variations in distance from the point of concentration, the varying promptness of the various governors in acting, the varying degrees of readiness to move of the organizations themselves, there will result an assembling of a percentage (unknown) of the organized militia by dribbles over a considerable period of time.

11. Character of the Force Assembled.—Section 18 of the Act of 1903 requires for participating in certain funds distributed by the federal government, participation in five days camp or march and twenty-four period of instruction. Assuming that a man attended five days' camp and twenty-four drills of one and one-half hours each, he would have received about sixty hours' instruction in a year. The last report of the chief of staff states that "over thirty per cent failed attend twenty-four drills" and the "it is believed to be a safe conclusion, that not a single unit at its maximum strength marched a distance of ten miles fully equipped and armed."

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12. Time This Force May Be Held for Service.—Section 4 of the act of 1908 (amending Section 5 of 1903) states: "He may specify in his call the period for which such service is required. * * *

And—

"No commissioned officer, &c., * * * shall be held to service beyond the term of his existing commission or enlistment." Thus it is apparent that the best trained men would soon begin to drop out.

13. How This Force May Be Used.—The Constitution and laws based thereon provide that it may be used "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." But the attorney-general held, February 17, 1912: "I think that the constitutional provision here considered not only affords no warrant for the use of the militia by the general government, except to suppress insurrection, repel invasions, or execute the laws of the Union, but, by its careful enumeration of the three occasions or purposes for which the militia may be used, it forbids such use for any other purpose."

14. Wastefulness of System.—The secretary of war states on page 7 in his "Outline of Proposed Military Policy," Nov. 1, 1915: "Federal government appropriates \$6,614,532.13 annually, for or on behalf of the national guard. The states individually appropriate for their respective guards an aggregate of \$6,244,214.98 annually," or a total of \$12,858,747.11. This sum, at a cost per man of \$914, would support 14,063 trained men constantly in service.

15. As deterring the raising of volunteers: Section 4 of the Act of 1908, amending section 5 of the Act of 1903, provides: "The organized militia shall be called into service of the United States in advance of any volunteer force which it may be determined to raise." Section 3 of the Act of 1914 provides that when three-fourths of the minimum strength of each organization volunteers * * * it may be received into a volunteer forces in advance of other organizations, etc. It is believed that these sections will have the effect of holding up volunteering until it is known what the organized militia is going to do.

16. Number of organized militia and amount of training of those secured by the call: When the organized militia is concentrated in response to the President's call, we will have of the existing organized militia personnel, as militia called into the service of the United States, a force certainly not exceeding 75,000, with average instruction not exceeding ninety hours, with officers appointed by the governors, trained by the states, with constitutional limitations as to the purposes for which it may be used.

17. The organization of organized militia and training of personnel as an asset: Reorganization of the Land (Page 58) states: " * * * is a * * * in being * * * of"

try contend that the defects outlined in the war college document are remedied in the Hay bill, which has passed the lower house of congress and which now is in conference.

On the other hand, a majority of regular army officers and many eminent legal authorities contend that the provisions of the Hay bill in question are not constitutional, a contention that is combated by the guard officers. The consensus of opinion in the army is that the Chamberlain or senate bill, which creates a volunteer army, absolute under federal control, and which substantially increases the regular army is the best solution of the problem before the congress. The situation, it exists at the present moment, army officers say, is correctly pictured in the war college document.

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George Washington Is Quoted

5. Worthlessness of the Militia: To show its lack of value as a military asset the following statements are quoted from the writings of George Washington: "Certain I am that it would be cheaper to keep 50,000 or 100,000 in constant pay than to depend upon one-half the number and supply the other half occasionally by militia. The time the latter are in pay before and after they are in camp, assembling and marching, the waste of ammunition, the consumption of stores which * * * they must be furnished with or sent

(Continued on Page 11)

will in my opinion prove, if the scheme is adhered to, the ruin of our cause."

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