

**NGB-J5
Homeland Defense
Problem Framing**

Paper #1



20 March 2024

FOREWARD

This paper is the first of a three-paper series designed to generate an enterprise approach to thought, discussion, and planning for National Guard contributions to homeland defense. We seek to determine how the National Guard can best prepare itself in a contested homeland environment to simultaneously fulfill its dual mission responsibilities to Department of Defense (DoD) and state/territorial/DC authorities during crises and potential armed conflict.

Every day, the National Guard provides strategic depth to the Joint Force as its operational combat reserve. The National Guard supports total force policy by providing trained, ready, and interoperable units for global requirements. Additionally, the National Guard offers quick response support to DoD and state/territorial/DC authorities in the homeland during crises and disasters.

The National Guard's Citizen Soldier and Airman model creates a unique interconnectedness, value, and experience between our Guardsmen and the American people within our communities. These enduring attributes are particularly profound when the National Guard conducts activities in the homeland.

Today, America's adversaries are developing and employing new capabilities to threaten our homeland, disturb the American way of life, and degrade America's ability to project power globally to enforce international order. Thus, the National Guard should prepare for its increasingly dynamic role in homeland defense.

Our challenge is to find innovative and integrated approaches to achieve readiness for homeland defense while maintaining mission balance and predictability at home and abroad. These challenges will require teamwork with our interagency partners at all federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal levels.

Homeland defense is the Department of Defense's #1 priority. This paper is the first step in our homeland defense planning endeavor. Within these pages, we frame the problem to spark interest, guide discussion, and solicit inputs from across the National Guard and National Security Enterprise. The active participation of all stakeholders will be essential to our success.



Darrin E. Slaten
Major General, U.S. Air Force
Director, Strategy, Plans, Policy
and International Affairs

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- Acknowledges Homeland Defense (HD) as the DoD's #1 priority.
- Reiterates that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau's guidance is to "support integrated deterrence through *deterrence by resilience* – activities that enable the NG and our communities to withstand, fight through, and recover quickly from disruption."
- Describes the contested homeland environment, threats, and vulnerabilities.
- Frames the problem of preparing the National Guard (NG) to simultaneously fulfill its dual mission responsibilities to DoD and states/territories/DC authorities in the homeland and abroad across the spectrum of competition, crisis, and armed conflict.
- Outlines an approach to solving the HD problem through a series of three papers:
 - Paper #1 – NG HD Problem Framing
 - Paper #2 – NG HD Gap Analysis
 - Paper #3 – NG HD Operational Approach
- Solicits inputs and participation from all NG and National Security Enterprise (NSE) stakeholders.
- Discusses the distinguishing characteristics between HD and Homeland Security (HS). The Department of Defense (DoD) is the lead federal agency (LFA) for HD, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the LFA for HS.
- Discusses the risks associated with HD.
- Provides a desired end state - The NG is postured and ready to concurrently fulfill its dual mission responsibilities to federal and state authorities in the homeland and abroad across the spectrum of competition, crisis, and armed conflict.

CONTENTS

Foreword... 1

Executive Summary 2

Preface 4

1. Introduction..... 5

2. Strategic Guidance for Homeland Defense. 6

3. The Contested Homeland Operational Environment..... 9

4. The Homeland Defense Problem 10

5. Risk. 14

6. Costs, Desired End State, and Conclusion 15-16

ANNEX A: Definitions 17


ANNEX B: Acronyms 18

ANNEX C: Logic Map 19

PREFACE


“Make sure that when your starting quarterback is in the game, he has the best pass protection unit available. Immeasurable losses... occur... because of... excessive blitzing by the defense, and a breakdown in pass protection...”

(Bill Walsh, Finding the Winning Edge, 1998)



The Department of Defense (DoD) applies strategy to win wars. In both football and war, limited means are aligned against desired ends with the hope of gaining advantages over an opponent to ultimately achieve victory. In war, DoD must make tough decisions regarding the investment of limited means for Homeland Defense versus warfighting overseas. Some argue that the American Way of War is characterized by an effort to win wars overseas so that we are not required to fight wars at home. But, similar to football, could an adversary perceive a misalignment of means and blitz the homeland? If so, how would DoD react, and how can DoD use the National Guard to best achieve a balance at home and overseas? These are the types of questions that we hope this paper will expose.

1. Introduction



This three-paper series challenges us to consider how we will execute Homeland Defense (HD) as the National Guard (NG). The purpose of Paper #1 is to frame the problem of how the NG can best prepare and posture itself in a contested homeland environment to simultaneously fulfill its dual mission responsibilities to DoD and state/territorial/DC authorities during crises and potential armed conflict. This Paper #1, “Homeland Defense Problem Framing,” is intended to spark interest and guide discussions about homeland defense and “deterrence by resilience”¹ across the NG and National Security Enterprise (NSE). Throughout this process, we request inputs from the Air National Guard (ANG), Army National Guard (ARNG), and our 54 state, district, and territorial Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ).²

Next, Paper #2, “Homeland Defense Gap Analysis,” will provide a gap analysis of the problem sets described in Paper #1. The NGB-J55 will chair an HD operational planning team (OPT) to consolidate inputs and feedback from all stakeholders regarding Paper #1. The HD OPT will then refine the gap analysis recommendation within Paper #1 and publish a comprehensive gap analysis in Paper #2.

Finally, Paper #3, “Homeland Defense Operational Approach,” will outline an Operational Approach to tackle the problems and capability gaps that were identified in Papers #1 & #2. Paper #3 will describe broad actions the NG can take to achieve national objectives for HD, provide a visualization for how we can transform current

¹ Chief, National Guard Bureau, *National Guard Bureau National Defense Strategy Guidance – In Support of the 2022 National Defense Strategy*, Arlington, VA: NGB, 2023. “Deterrence by resilience activities enable the NG and our communities to withstand, fight through, and recover quickly from disruption.”

² State JFHQs can submit comments for the HD paper series through the J5 FAC Microsoft Teams site. POC is MAJ Dave Muehling, david.r.muehling4.mil@army.mil <https://armyeitaas.sharepoint-mil.us/:f:/r/teams/J5FAC/Shared%20Documents/General/Homeland%20Defense%20Paper%20Series?csf=1&web=1&e=ohVpA4>

HD conditions into desired conditions, and broadly describe objectives along Lines of Effort (LOEs) that will underpin the detailed planning guidance that will follow.

2. Strategic Guidance for Homeland Defense

The National Defense Strategy outlines four priorities: (1) Defend the homeland, (2) Deter strategic attack, (3) Deter Aggression, and (4) Modernize the Force.³ The DoD's priorities are advanced in three ways: (A) Integrated deterrence, (B) Campaigning, and (C) Building enduring advantages.⁴

Defend the Homeland

DoD is the lead federal agency (LFA) for Homeland Defense (HD), defined as:

“the military protection of U.S. sovereignty and territory against external threats and aggression or, as directed by the President, other threats.”⁵

The six DoD priority initiatives for HD are⁶:

- Deter aggression against the homeland by pursuing initiatives that seek to raise direct and indirect costs for potential attackers and reduce the benefits of possible attacks.
- Improve resilience to an attack, across the spectrum of conflict, to prevent potential competitors from advancing their objectives or severely limiting U.S. response options.
- Focus on defending defense critical infrastructure against attacks in all domains and build resiliency and redundancy to fight through disruptions and maintain the ability to mobilize and respond to crisis or conflict.
- Ensure continuity of operations and continuity of government.
- Build resilience against the impacts of climate change that impact DoD's ability to exercise homeland defense missions.
- Ensure resilience in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response capabilities associated with homeland defense missions.

³Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense (OSD), *2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS)*, Washington, DC, October 27, 2022.

⁴ Director, Joint Forces Development, JP 3-27, *Homeland Defense*, Washington, DC, December 12, 2023

⁵ Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense (OSD), *2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS)*, Washington, DC, October 27, 2022.

⁶ Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense (OSD), *2023 OSD Homeland Defense Policy Guidance Unclassified Fact Sheet*, Washington, DC, February 21, 2024

Integrated Deterrence

Integrated deterrence depends upon HD, and HD is strengthened through deterrence by resilience activities. The concept of deterrence rests upon a secure and credible retaliatory or second-strike capability, both conventional and nuclear. To be deterred, an adversary must believe that America has the will and ability to retaliate with decisive force. America's capacity to generate and project combat-credible forces is fundamental to integrated deterrence. Deterrence is significantly undermined if an adversary believes they can disrupt America's force generation and power projection capabilities in the homeland. Therefore, the NG faces a dual challenge to enable integrated deterrence by building resilience at home while concurrently building readiness for warfighting abroad.

CNGB's National Defense Strategy Guidance regarding Integrated Deterrence:

“The NG supports integrated deterrence through **deterrence by resilience** – activities that enable the NG and our communities to withstand, fight through, and recover quickly from disruption. Deterrence by resilience includes supporting state, local, and tribal authorities with mitigating vulnerabilities in cyber networks, maintaining NG Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Response Enterprise Forces, protecting critical infrastructure, and modernizing the mobilization enterprise. These actions not only enhance our ability to remain responsive to our communities but also enhance overall deterrence by reducing our competitors' perception of the benefits of aggression.”⁷

Thus, planning for the NG's contributions to homeland defense and deterrence by resilience activities is urgent and vital.

Homeland Security (HS)

DHS is the lead for HS, defined as:

“A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur.”

DHS missions under the general concept of HS include the following⁸:

- 1) Prevent terrorism and enhance security.
- 2) Secure and manage our borders.
- 3) Enforce and administer our immigration laws.

⁷ Chief, National Guard Bureau, *2023 NGB NDS Strategy Guidance in support of 2022 OSD NDS*, Washington, DC, May 3, 2023.

⁸ Director, Joint Force Development for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication (JP) 3-28 Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, Washington, DC, October 29, 2018.

- 4) Safeguard and secure cyberspace.
- 5) Ensure resilience to disasters
- 6) Mature and strengthen the HS enterprise.

HD is distinct from Homeland Security (HS).⁹ DoD is the LFA for HD, and DHS is the LFA for HS. DoD may support DHS or another agency through Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA); however, DSCA activities are not HD. DoD does not size, shape, resource, or scope major plans/operations for anticipated DSCA missions.¹⁰ On the other hand, DoD is the LFA for HD and should determine its requirements from other FSLTT partners in advance.

The NG is authorized to conduct federal Homeland Defense Activities in either Title 10 or Title 32 duty status under their respective authorities.¹¹ Pursuant to law and DoD policy, both require Secretary of Defense (SecDef) approval. States also have the prerogative to conduct State defense and law enforcement activities not otherwise reserved to the federal government in State Active Duty (SAD) status pursuant to respective State laws.¹²

DoD's HD priorities may significantly differ from DHS's priorities. DoD will likely prioritize the defense of DoD assets necessary for force generation and power projection, while DHS will likely prioritize its HS requirements. Thus, it is critical for the NG and NSE to fully understand the distinguishing characteristics and department responsibilities between HD and HS.

⁹ *Ibid.*, JP 3-27. Homeland Security is: "A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States and to reduce our vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies. Also called HS.


¹⁰ Army National Guard Strategic Plans and Policy (ARNG-G5-SPP), *Quick Reference Chart: Mobilization, Training, and Response Authorities*, Arlington, VA: NGB, 05 September 2023.

¹¹ Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3160.01, *Homeland Defense Activities Conducted by the National Guard*, Washington, DC: Pentagon, August 25, 2008 incorporating Change 2, June 6, 2017.

¹² *Ibid.*, Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3160.01, *Homeland Defense Activities Conducted by the National Guard*, Washington, DC: Pentagon, August 25, 2008 incorporating Change 2, June 6, 2017. "Requests may be submitted during or after National Guard execution of a homeland defense activity in a State active duty status." See also: Chief, National Guard Bureau, *National Guard Domestic Law Enforcement Support and Mission Assurance Operations (NGR 500-5)*, Arlington, VA: NGB, August 18, 2010. "State laws and policies govern the use of National Guard Soldiers and Airmen in support of domestic law enforcement support and mission assurance operations while serving in state active duty and US Code, Title 32 statuses. State laws and policies authorize National Guard members in either Title 32 or state active duty (SAD) status to support law enforcement agencies and are implemented through state plans and policies. As most National Guard operations in support of law enforcement and mission assurance are conducted in a non-federalized status, a clear understanding of applicable state policies is critical to mission success."


3. The Contested Homeland Operational Environment

“The scope and scale of threats to the homeland have fundamentally changed...The PRC and Russia...are already using non-kinetic means against our defense industrial base and mobilization enterprise, as well as deploying counter-space capabilities that can target our Global Positioning System and other space-based capabilities that support military operations and daily civilian life. These threats... will increase demands on the DoD’s resources, federal and civil authorities, and the public and private sectors.”¹³



Increasing demands without increasing the means to meet those demands will result in risks that must be mitigated.¹⁴ How will the NG satisfy all the competing demands within a contested homeland environment while confronting crisis and potential armed conflict?

Multiple threats from the below list would create domestic chaos and disrupt DoD’s force generation and power projection capabilities:



- Cyber Attacks
- Contested GPS and Cell-Phone Communications
- Misinformation
- Loss of Electricity
- Loss of Water
- Pandemic
- Economic and Banking Turbulence
- Robo call bomb threats to Public Schools and Daycares
- Standard Natural Disasters
- Overwhelmed Roads, Airways, and Ports
- Civil Disturbance

¹³ Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense (OSD), *2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS)*, Washington, DC: SecDef, October 27, 2022, *2023 NGB NDS Guidance*.

¹⁴ For demands of Army NG, please see Director, Army National Guard Paper #1: Asking the Right Questions, 8 February 2023.

4. The Homeland Defense Problem

PROBLEM STATEMENT: How should the NG ensure it is prepared to simultaneously fulfill its dual DoD and state/territorial/DC responsibilities in the homeland and abroad in a contested environment across the spectrum of competition, crisis, and armed conflict?

American warfighting abroad will be undermined if an adversary disrupts American force generation and power projection capabilities in the homeland. During armed conflict, the DoD will prioritize its application of limited NG means across four competing demands:

- (a) warfighting abroad under Title 10,
- (b) HD under Title 10 or Title 32, Chp 9,
- (c) NG forces for SAD support to SLTT leaders during crises,
- (d) and DSCA under Title 32 or Title 10.¹⁵




Figure 4: NG Dual-Responsibilities Dilemma





Figure 5: A Model of Combined Crisis and Conflict in a Contested Homeland Environment.

¹⁵ Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense (OSD), *Defense Support of Civil Authorities, incorporating Change 2*, DODD 3025.18, March 19, 2018, para 2b "...applies to National Guard personnel when the Secretary of Defense determines that it is appropriate to employ National Guard personnel in title 32, U.S.C. (Reference (f)), status to fulfill a request for DSCA, the Secretary of Defense requests the concurrence of the Governors of the affected States, and those Governors concur in the employment of National Guard personnel in such a status."

At some point along the spectrum of conflict, the NG's available means will be expended by the desired ends and requirements of DoD and state/territory/DC authorities during crises occurring simultaneously with armed conflict. Thus, the NG should develop a plan to realign its ends and means within a contested homeland environment.



While expectations and requirements in the homeland may increase, the NG should not expect a dramatic increase in means. Consequently, the NG should conduct deterrence by resilience activities in the homeland to build enduring advantages and integrate with partners to create synergetic effects. To achieve this goal, this paper seeks to begin the process of solving four subsets of the problem:

Four Homeland Defense Problem Statement Subsets:


- 1. Speaking the same language across the NG and security enterprise**
- 2. NG HD Capability Gap Identification**
- 3. NG HD Planning**
- 4. NG HD Deterrence by Resilience Activities**

Problem Subset 1 (Speaking the Same Language): FSLTT authorities across the NG and NSE must speak the same language when discussing homeland defense and deterrence by resilience. We need a standardized language and shared understanding of:

- HD & HS definitions and corresponding responsibilities between FSLTT and NG JFHQs.
- Distinguishing characteristics of NG utilization under Title 10, Title 32, and SAD authorities.
- Policy implications, including the Global Force Management process, Total Force Policy, etc....
- NG history, statutory reform, and utilization in prior wars and crises.

The NSE must understand the NG’s dual mission and how to best utilize the NG in the Homeland to create strategic depth across the competition continuum. This understanding begins with education on definitions, unique characteristics, authorities, policy, and the history of NG utilization.

Problem Subset 2 (NG HD Capability Gap Identification): The NG should comprehensively identify its capability, capacity, or resourcing gaps within a contested homeland environment of crisis and armed conflict.



- Identify Requirements. FSLTT authorities should comprehensively identify, list, and cross-reference their anticipated requirements and expectations during a contested homeland environment. DoD has NG requirements – and programs and budgets to meet these requirements. SLTTs have needs that the NG can fulfill —and program and budget almost exclusively for State Active Duty NG activities (not capability development or resource/asset procurement).
 - *Example: Some FSLTT authorities have identified non-DoD “critical infrastructure (CI),” But these lists are potentially not reconciled with DoD’s DCI list. Some FSLTT partners may incorrectly assume critical infrastructure is on the DoD’s DCI list.*
 - *Example: DoD’s Arctic Strategy contains requirements that the DoD should cross-reference with SLTT expectations, particularly in Alaska.*
 - *Example: State Installation Deployment Support Plans (IDSP) should list NG force requirements to support mobilization in a contested environment.*
- Refine the NG’s purpose in HD.
 - *Does utilizing the NG as a quick reaction force during homeland disasters or crises distract from building warfighting readiness?*
 - *Will investments in homeland resilience distract from NG warfighting readiness abroad?*
 - *Will investments in homeland resilience create a dependence upon the NG amongst non-DoD agencies and partners?*
 - *Who will fill the homeland defense and resilience void if the NG deploys overseas?*

Prioritization: FSLTT authorities should prioritize and reconcile their requirements and expectations. Planners cannot adequately align resources to requirements and expose gaps without prioritization. DoD and States/Territories/DC, as the approval authorities, can prioritize and filter, by approving and disapproving, Federal and SLTT requests.

- *Resource Alignment Consideration: The NG may perform some HD activities best: (a) under SAD or Title 32 versus Title 10, or (b) because of geographic home field advantage such as in Alaska or Hawaii, or (c) because of the unique interconnectedness of Guardsmen who may already perform a similar function for their civilian employment.*
- Capability Gaps: Planners should identify capability, capacity, or resourcing gaps by aligning NG capabilities against the prioritized list of requirements and expectations.

Problem Subset 3 (NG HD Planning): The NGB should develop a support plan to build enduring advantages through integration that overcome the identified capability, capacity, resourcing, and readiness gaps regarding homeland defense and deterrence by resilience activities. The plan should also provide state JFHQs guidance for coordinating, synchronizing, and perhaps integrating HD into existing state all-hazards plans.

- *Example: A substantial amount of HD information is CLASSIFIED, and detailed planning requires a CLASSIFIED space and capability. The NG should expand its CLASSIFIED capabilities and encourage our partners to do the same.*

Problem Subset 4 (NG HD Deterrence by Resilience Activities): The NGB should determine authorities and identify resources to actively conduct deterrence by resilience activities in the homeland that support SLTT authorities and interagency partners in building homeland resilience to deter adversaries.

- *Example: U.S.C. Title 32 Chapter 9 gives the SecDef authority to use the NG to conduct “homeland defense activities.” Or the NG could be mobilized under U.S.C. Title 10 to perform HD. Or the SecDef could use U.S.C. Title 32 Chapter 5 authority to use the NG to support homeland security activities.*
- *Example: DoD should address the role of a Dual-Status Commander (DSC) in each potential scenario of NG utilization in the homeland under different authorities.*

5. Risk is the probability and consequence of an event causing harm to something valued.¹⁶ Risk increases if desired ends and available means are misaligned. Strategic risk to our homeland will continue to grow until we develop an HD utilization plan for the NG.



Figure 8: CJCSM 3105.01A Risk Analysis

¹⁶ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Risk Analysis Methodology (CJCSM 3105.01A)*, 12 October 2021.

Risk to Mission. Currently, NG can fulfill its military objectives within acceptable human, material, and financial costs. However, risk to mission could become HIGH because crises occurring simultaneously with armed conflict abroad could quickly consume the NG's available means.

Risk is inherent to the NG's dual-responsibilities mission. An over-investment in warfighting readiness may neglect risks to the homeland. Likewise, an over-investment in HD may distract from warfighting readiness. Additionally, other agencies may become excessively dependent upon NG support. Consequently, to reduce risk, the NG will need innovative ways to build enduring advantages that provide synergetic effects in the homeland while complementing warfighting. Failure to plan for NG contributions to homeland defense and deterrence by resilience will undermine integrated deterrence, and could degrade America's ability to generate and project power to win in war. A weak homeland also jeopardizes retaliatory strike capability, a key element of deterrence.

Risk to Force. Currently, the NG can generate sufficient trained and ready forces to meet current campaign and contingency mission requirements. However, the risk to force could become HIGH because, without modernization and enduring advantages, the NG could struggle to generate enough forces to meet its dual requirements in a contested homeland environment of simultaneous crisis and armed conflict.

6. Costs

The cost of integrated deterrence through homeland resilience activities is minimal if the NG designs innovative and integrated ways to conduct resilience activities that complement warfighting readiness.

7. Desired End-state

The NG is postured and ready to fulfill its dual mission responsibilities to DoD and state/territory/DC authorities in the homeland and to DoD authorities abroad across the spectrum of competition, crisis, and armed conflict.

At End State:

- 1) The NG and NSE use standardized language and understand NG utilization policy and authorities.
- 2) The NG HD planning guidance fills capability, capacity, or resourcing gaps and guides state JFHQs to plan homeland defense and deterrence by resilience activities.
- 3) The NG deliberately conducts deterrence by resilience activities in the homeland to build resilience and deter adversaries while complementing warfighting readiness.

8. Conclusion

We hope Paper #1, “Homeland Defense Problem Framing,” will spark interest and guide productive discussions about homeland defense and NG deterrence by resilience activities across the NG and NSE. This three-paper series allows us to consider how we will execute HD as the NG. We look forward to your input to help us identify innovative ways to build resilience, enduring advantages, and support integrated deterrence in the homeland, while innovatively complementing warfighting readiness, force generation, and power projection to win during war.

ANNEX A: Definitions

defense critical infrastructure. Department of Defense and non-Department of Defense networked assets and facilities essential to project, support, and sustain military forces and operations worldwide. Also called DCI. (JP 3-27)

homeland. The physical region that includes the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, United States territories, and surrounding territorial waters and airspace. (JP 3-28)

homeland defense. The military protection of U.S. sovereignty and territory against external threats and aggression or, as directed by the President, other threats. (JP 3-27)

homeland security. A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States and to reduce our vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies. Also called HS. (JP 3-27)

lead federal agency. The federal agency that leads and coordinates the overall federal response to an emergency. Also called LFA. (JP 3-41)

national security enterprise. For the purposes of this document, all governmental organizations that contribute to national security, to include, but not limited to, DoD, DHS, interagency, and federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal governments.

ANNEX B: Acronyms

ANG	Air National Guard
ARNG	Army National Guard
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high yield Explosives
CI	Critical Infrastructure
CIP-MAA	Critical Infrastructure Protection – Mission Assurance Assessments
CISA	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
DC	District of Columbia
DCI	Defense Critical Infrastructure
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DoD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
DSC	Dual Status Commander
DSCA	Defense Support of Civil Authorities
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FSLTT	Federal, State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial
GFMAP	Global Force Management Allocation Plan
GPS	Global Positioning System
IDSP	Installation Deployment Support Plan
JFHQ	Joint Force Headquarters
HD	Homeland Defense
HS	Homeland Security
LFA	Lead Federal Agency
MOSQ	Military Occupation Specialty Qualified
NG	National Guard
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NSE	National Security Enterprise
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PRC	People’s Republic of China
SAD	State Active Duty
SLTT	State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial
USC	United States Code
USCBP	United States Customs and Border Protection

ANNEX C: Logic Map

